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EFFECT OF SECTION 302(c)(5)
TRUST FUND RESTRICTIONS ON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION

Generally, section 302(a) and (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act
prohibits both payments by an employer to a representative of his employees
and the acceptance of such payments.' This legislation was enacted in 1947
to prevent bribery2 and extortion 3 and, particularly, to prevent funds, contributed by an employer for the establishment of employee benefit programs,
from being under the complete domination of the union.4 Prior to 1947, it
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 302(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 180(a)-(b)
(1964). This section provides:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers .or any person
who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or who
acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or
deliver, any money or other thing of value(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed In an
industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees
of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(5) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer
employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or committee directly or
indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an industry
affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of his actions,
decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or employee
of such labor organization.
(b) (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept,
or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or
other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or for any person acting
as an officer, agent, representative, or employee of such labor organization, to
demand or accept from the operator of any motor vehicle (as defined in part II
of the Interstate Commerce Act) employed in the transportation of property
in commerce, or the employer of any such operator, any money or other thing
of value payable to such organization or to an officer, agent, representative or
employee thereof as a fee or charge for the unloading, or in connection with the
unloading, of the cargo of such vehicle: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to make unlawful any payment by an employer to any
of his employees as compensation for their services as employees.
Ibid.
2 93 CONG. REc. 4678 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball).
8 93 CONG. REc. 4746 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 52 (1947).
4 93 CONG. REc. 4678-79, 4746-47 (1947).
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had been the practice for employers to contribute money to union officials
to create employee welfare programs which were administered solely by
the union. As these employee benefit funds increased in quantity and size,5
tremendous amounts of employer contributed money were being controlled
completely by the union. In 1946 the situation became critical when John
L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers, began fighting with the
mine owners for the establishment of a mammoth fund which was to be
administered solely by his union.6 Lewis insisted that the employers pay a
royalty of ten cents per ton of mined coal into a fund which was to provide
health, welfare and retirement benefits for miners. The employer's only
function was to make the royalty payments and the union would have complete control over the management of the fund and the dispensation of
benefits therefrom. Recognizing the increased power that control over additional millions of dollars would give not only to Lewis but to other union
leaders, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act of 19357 by
creating an entirely new section, section 302, which begins with a broad
prohibition against an employer's making payments of any kind to a union
which represents his employees.
In order to provide for situations in which Congress deemed it permissible for the employer to make payments to his employees or to a labor organization, Congress enacted certain exceptions to the broad prohibition of
section 302(a). These exceptions are listed in subsection (c). 8 One of these
5 For a discussion of statistics showing the growth of welfare funds, see Lambos, Policing
the Trustee: The Law Governing Labor-Management Employee Benefit Funds, In
SYrosIUM ON LABOR RmATmONS IAw 611-15 (Slovenko ed. 1961); Iaacson, Employee
Welfare and Pension Plans:Regulations and Protection of Employee Rights, 59 Co Lum. L.
Rpv. 96, 97-98 (1959); Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1181 (1960).
6 A prolonged strike induced by a bitter dispute between the United Mine Workers and
mine owners over safety, working conditions, wages and welfare benefits resulted in federal
seizure of the mines, an injunction against the striking mine workers and the conviction
of John L. Lewis and the UMIV for dvil and criminal contempt of court. United States
v. UW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See also Hearings Before Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1984-2020 (1947) (Lewis' reasons for demanding welfare benefits); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 50-52 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947); 93 CoNG. R. 4678 (1947).
7 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
8 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1946). This section provides:
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) in respect to any money
or other thing of value payable by an employer to any of his employees whose esmablished duties include acting openly for such employer in matters of labor relations
or personnel administration or to any representative of his employees, or to any
officer or employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee or former employee of such employer, as compensation for, or by reason of, his service as an
employee of such employer;, (2) with respect to the payment or delivery of any money
or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or
award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment, ettlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud
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exceptions, section 302(c)(5) and (6), deals with the problem which was

mainly responsible for the enactment of section 302, the employee welfare
and pensions plans. This exception permits an employer to confer health

and welfare benefits on his employees through the medium of a trust fund.
However, the trust fund to which an employer may legally make payments
must meet certain requirements. In order to fall within the section 302(c)(5)
and (6) trust fund exception, the trust must be established for the sole and
or duress; (3) with respect to the sale or purchase of an article or commodity at the
prevailing market price in the regular course of business; (4) with respect to money
deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor
organization: Provided, That the employer has received from each employee, on
whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be
irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the
applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; (5) with respect to money or
other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the
sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees
of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents):
Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either
from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and
dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or
insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance,
disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which
such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer,
and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such
'fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and
the representatives of employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and
employee groups deadlock on -the administration of such fund and there are no neutral
persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two
groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their
failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide
such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of
the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and
shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the
results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal
office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written
agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of
providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which
provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying
such pensions or annuities; or (6) with respect to money or other thing of value paid
by any employer to a trust fund established by such representative for the purpose
of pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training programs: Provided, That the requirements of clause
(B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection shall apply to such trust funds.
Ibid.
In addition to providing criminal penalties for the wilful violation of § 302 of the
LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (1964), § 186(e) gives the federal district courts jurisdiction to

restrain violations.
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exclusive benefit of the employees, their families and dependents. In addidon, payments from the principal or income of such trust funds must be
for specified benefits: medical and hospital care; retirement or death pensions; compensation for injuries or illness; group insurance; vacation; holiday or severence benefits; or defraying the cost of training programs. Also,
the statute requires that the detailed basis upon which the trust payments
are to be made be specified in a written agreement with the employer.
Finally, section 302(c)(5) requires that employees and employers must be
equally represented in the administration of the trust fund, with such neutral persons as may be agreed upon, and the trust agreement must contain
provisions for breaking deadlocks and for an annual audit of the trust fund.
These requirements represent congressional expression of the reasons for
the enactment of section 302. Congress felt that to prevent the objectionable
practices of bribery, extortion and, most of all, union control over employee
welfare funds, the trust to which an employer would be allowed to contribute must be specifically detailed by Congress.
Certainly these requirements for the statutory trust fund have done much
toward the accomplishment of their purpose. But, it is submitted that these
requirements are unduly restrictive in that they have precluded the establishment of certain trusts not because they would create a practice which
Congress has condemned, i.e., shakedowns of employers or union control of
welfare money, but because one or more of these requirements could not be
met. Particularly, the provisions specifying the purposes for which payments
may be held in trust has caused the courts to invalidate trusts established
for laudable purposes, and prevented others from ever leaving the bargaining table, only because the trust was established to provide benefits not
listed in this provision. A classic example of just such a situation is presented
in InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.0 where labor
and management solved an automation dispute by the creation of a trust
fund to compensate employees for lost working hours, and to compensate
the union for lost dues. The trust fund was declared invalid because the
enumerated permissible purposes of trust funds do not include compensating a union for lost dues. Thus a trust was ended simply because it violated
the requirement that a trust fund may only be established for certain
specified benefits. Therefore, the efforts of labor and management to cooperatively work together to solve a labor dispute were disastrously brought
to an end.
The existence of employee benefit programs is not a rarity. Since World
War II the growth of employer sponsored welfare and pension plans in
the United States has been phenomenal.' 0 Several factors have contributed
9 326 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1964).
10 U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Welfare and Pension Plans
Investigation, S. RE,. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Douglas Report); U.S. Senate
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to the popularity of employee benefit plans. Employer contributions to
welfare funds are deductible from gross income either as reasonable and
necessary business expenses, 1 or as contributions to qualified pension
plans.1 2 Employee's benefits are subject to income taxation, if at all, when
received, 13 and the income of a qualified welfare fund is tax exempt. 14
Also, employees put greater pressure on their employers to establish such
funds as the costs of medical protection increased to unexpected proportions.' 5 And probably the most important inducement to the growth of
welfare and pension plans was the designation of such employee benefit
programs as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.' 0 Since the number of trusts established for employee benefits is great and, also, since the
trust form is a readily available vehicle through which labor and management can work together, the restrictive provisions of the trust need to be
examined in detail, particularly the provision restricting the purposes for
which a trust fund may be established.
This Note will discuss the numerous instances in which the various
restrictive provisions of section 302(c)(5) and (6)have unfortunately thwarted
the attempts of labor and management to seek solutions to their mutual
problems. The ineffective attempts by Congress to correct this situation
will then be evaluated. Finally, this Note will suggest a new approach to
the problem of preserving employers' payments to employee benefit trusts
free from bribery, extortion and union control without the undesirable
result of preventing labor and management from promoting worthwhile
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, S.
REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (Kennedy Report); Note, 8 STAN. L. REV. 655
(1956).
11 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. This section states, in relevant part, that: "There shall
be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404. This section states, in relevant part, that: "If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or
annuity plan. ... they shall be deductible .... "
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a). This section states, in relevant part, that: "... the
amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee by any employees' trust
... shall be taxable to him in the year in which so distributed or made available ..
14 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501.
Section 501(a) states that: "An organization described in subsection (c) ... shall be exempt
from taxation . ..."
Section 501(c)(9) lists the following organizations: "Voluntary employees' beneficiary
associations providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits . ..."
15 Isaacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of E111ployee Rights, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 96, 98 (1959).
16 Inland Steel, 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1947), enforced, Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pension plans); W.V. Cross & Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1162, enforced, W.V. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (welfare
plan); General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949) (group life plan).
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programs with such trust funds. This new approach will be outlined in the
form of a recommendation that the regulation of trust funds by an inflexible
and restrictive statute be abolished, and a government agency be established
with appropriate standards to approve and regulate such employee welfare
trust funds.
LEGIslATIVE HISTORY

In order to effectively evaluate the restrictive provisions of the section
302(c)(5) and (6) trust fund, it is necessary to examine the purposes behind
their passage. The specific reasons for the enactment of the requirements

of a trust fund have been mentioned. However, in order to suggest an
alternative to these provisions which would also accomplish the purposes
of the restrictive provisions, it is essential that these purposes be dearly
stated.

The House of Representatives took the first step toward the enactment
of section 302 by adding it as an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act. The amendment, as originally passed in the House, included a
provision making it unlawful without exception, for an employer to make
payments of any kind to any health and welfare fund or trust established
by a labor organization or in which a labor organization would exercise any
management or disbursement control, directly or indirectly.17 On the other
hand, the bill reported to the Senate by the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare contained no provision prohibiting or restricting the funds
to which an employer could make payments.' s However, supplemental
views' 9 were filed by Senators Taft and Ball urging the adoption of a bill
to restrain employer payments to a union, but allowing an exception for
welfare payments if made to a trust fund jointly administered by labor and
management for specific purposes. Senator Ball spoke in favor of such a bill
on the Senate floor, stating that:
...the sole purpose of the amendment is not to prohibit welfare funds,
but to make sure that they are legitimate trust funds, used actually
for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them and that they shall not degenerate into bribes .... I

have heard of many cases in which unions have even relinquished wage
demands in order to secure a welfare fund with a percentage of the
payroll paid into the welfare fund ....There is a very grave danger
that the funds will be used for the personal gain of the union leaders,
or for political purposes, or other purposes not contemplated when
they are established .... 2o0
17 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a)(2)(C)(ii) (1947).
IsS.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1,at 31-47 (1947).
19 S. REP. No. 105, Supplemental Views, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947).
20 93 CONG. REC. 4678 (1947).
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To Senator Taft, the principal sponsor of the measure, elevating the administrators of employee benefit funds to the high status of fiduciaries was
necessary in order to control their conduct and safeguard the beneficiaries'
interest. Speaking in support of the bill he explained that any employee
benefit fund
must be a trust fund. It cannot be the property of the union without
a definite statement that it is in trust for the employees, who, after
all, have earned the money .... the purpose of the provision is that
the welfare fund shall be a perfectly definite fund, that its purpose
shall be stated so that each employee can know what he is entitled to,
can go to court and enforce his rights in the fund, and that it shall
not be, therefore, in the sole discretion of the union or the union
leaders and usable for any purpose which they may think is to the
advantage of the union or the employer.... The tendency is to demand
a welfare fund as much in the power of the union as possible. Certainly
unless we impose some restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund
will become merely a war chest for the particular union .... 21
...

The purpose of these proposals by Senators Taft and Ball was not limited
to protecting the interest of the beneficiaries of the welfare funds and
preventing the funds from being turned into "war chests" by the union.
They also aimed to prevent the payment of bribes by an employer to representatives of his employees, 22 and to prevent extortion or shakedowns of
employers by such representatives. 23
The compromise amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
reported by the Conference Committee 24 recommended the Senators' version, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 25 which finally came through the challenge
of a presidential veto to become law, contained section 302 restricting the
payments an employer can make to a representative of his employees or a
union. However, the act contained one notable exception-payments to
certain types of employee benefit trust funds. From this legislative history
it is apparent that the general congressional intent in section 302 was to
prevent the objectionable practices of bribery and extortion and, most importantly, to end abuse by union officials of employee welfare funds by
placing that standard of conduct imposed by the law of trusts on those
who jointly administer employee benefit trust funds and by specifying what
types of benefits could be established by such trust funds.
21 93 CONG. REc. 4746-47 (1947).
22 93 CONG. REC. 4678 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball).
23 93 CONG. RC. 4746 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); S. RE,. No. 105, 80th Cong.,

Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 52 (1947).
24 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1947).
25 The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 157 (1947).
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INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF TRUST REQUIREMENTS

It has been stated that the number of employee benefit trust funds has
greatly increased over the years, involving tremendous amounts of money.
The existence of these funds, together with the certainty that their numbers
would increase, spurred Congress to enact regulatory legislation. Congress
aimed by its legislation to protect these trust funds by prohibiting payments
from an employer to an employee's representative or union unless the
payments conformed to specific trust requirements. The language of section
502(a) determines who is forbidden to tender or accept payment. Therefore,
if one does not come under section 902(a) it is not necessary to conform
to the trust requirements in order to effectuate payment. Consequently,
the role played by the trust requirements depends on whether section 302(a)
is to be given a narrow or broad interpretation.
The most troublesome phrases in section 302(a) are those describing the
parties to whom payments are prohibited, i.e., "any representative of any
of his employees" and "any labor organization or any officer or employee
thereof, which represents, seeks to represent," because the term "representative" does not have a definite meaning.2 6 The first cases to struggle
with the definition of the term "representative," were Rice.Stix Dry Goods
Co. v. St. Louis Labor Health Institute 7 and United Marine Division v.
Essex Transportation Co. 2 8 In Rice-Stix the employer paid money to the
St. Louis Labor Health Institute which provided hospital and medical care
to its members who were employees of Rice-Stix Co. The funds were controlled by the Board of Trustees, who were representatives of employers,
employees and the public. The court found that the Institute was completely
independent of the union and was not a representative of employees because
it did not act in any way in negotiating contracts or in representing employees in grievances or other labor disputes with the employer.
Thus
payments to funds jointly administered by employer and union officials, not
meeting the requirements of section 302(c)(5), were permitted so long as the
fund did not engage in representing employees in their bargaining rela26 Section 501(3) of the LMRA provides that certain terms induding "representatives,"
as used in -the act, "shall have the same meaning as when used in the National Labor
Relations Act as amended .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1964). "Representative" is not
defined in the amended NLRA, § 2(4), although part of a section entitled "definitions,"
states merely that the term "indudes any individual or labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(4) (1964). However, the substantive sections in which reference is made to "representative" are concerned with the employees' right to organize and bargain collectively,
and accordingly the term is used to indicate an exclusive bargaining agent.
27 22 L.R.R.M. 2528 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 1948).
28 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1954).
29 The court found the Institute to be independent from the union even though the
president of the Institute was a director of the union controlling Rice-Stix's employees
and the Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute was also a negotiator.
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tionship with the employers. In Essex the court centered its attention upon
the party as a trustee and not upon whether the party participated in tie
collective bargaining process. The court held that the six trustees of an
employer welfare fund, three of whom were chosen by the union, were not
representatives of employees. The court stated:
These trustees were not, in our judgment, representatives of the employees. They were trustees of a welfare fund. It is true that they were
chosen half and half by the employers and union. But we think that
when set up as a board these individuals are not acting as representatives of either the union or the employers. 30
Reading these cases together, it seems that the court has designated as a
representative only those persons who deal directly with the employer at
the bargaining table or in solving employee grievances. All other persons,
no matter how closely associated with the union or employees, are not representatives within the meaning of section 302(a). Therefore, any union appointed trustee who refrains from collective bargaining, as in the Essex
case, is not prohibited from receiving payments from an employer. These
holdings rendered subsection (c)(5) meaningless; because if such joint boards
of trustees as found in Essex and Rice-Stix are not "representatives of any
of his employees," it is unnecessary for any welfare trust, whose trustees do
not participate in collective bargaining, to meet the requirements of section
302(c)(5), for payments to such trustees are not prohibited.
The Supreme Court in Ryan v. United States31 started a trend in the
opposite direction by broadening the meaning of representative. The lower
court3 2 in holding that Ryan, union president, was not a representative,
stated that throughout the Taft-Hartley Act the term consistently means
an agent selected as the exclusive bargaining representative by a majority
of the employees in a bargaining unit. Here the union was the exclusive
bargaining representative so payments to an individual were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court in reversing did not undertake to decide "if any official
of a union is ex officio a representative of the employees," 33 but held that
Ryan, as union president and principal negotiator, fell within this category.
The Court approved of the dissent below and further found that a narrow
reading of the term "representative" would frustrate the primary intent of
Congress, for unless union officers were representatives, employer welfare
payments made directly to a union official would not fall within section
302.
The Eighth Circuit3 4 followed the Ryan decision a year later with a
30 216 F.2d 410, 412 (3d Cir. 1954).

350 U.S. 299 (1956).
225 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1955).
83 350 U.S. 299, 301 (1956).

31
32

84 Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253, 264 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931
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decision that the trial court had not erred in instructing on the meaning
of "representative" as one authorized, empowered or designated in any way,
directly or indirectly, by an employee or employees, to represent them in any
matter relating to wages and other terms of employment and that it was not
necessary that he actually carry out these functions if so authorized. Another
circuit court 3 5 considered the problem arising where the employer contributed to a joint industry board which dealt with certain types of disputes
between union and employer under a collective bargaining agreement.
Because of these activities the board was held to be a representative, and
employer payments to it were held to be illegal as violative of section 302(a).
Thus Ryan and the cases which followed, demonstrated that one need
not be the exclusive bargaining representative or that one's activities in the
field of collective bargaining need not be extensive or even exercised to be
labeled a representative. Although these cases broadened the term "representative," they indicate that the courts were still using the criterion of
whether the party represented the employee in a bargaining capacity in
deciding if such party is a representative within the meaning of section
302(a). Consequently, even though these cases gave a broader definition to
"representative," it took another series of cases to do away with the bargaining criteria in regard to trustees.
In 1959 two cases reached different results in deciding the status of a
trustee under section 302(a). In the first case, the circuit court 30 held that a
trustee was a "representative," not because of his involvement in collective
bargaining activities, but on the basis of his position as a trustee. In this
case the employer supported a jointly administered labor-management trust
fund for such purposes as maintaining facilities for arbitration and adjustment of grievances, health and welfare benefits, and an apprenticeship
training program. In holding the trustees "representatives," the court stated:
No fund derived from employer contributions may be administered by
persons designated by a union unless the fund meets the standards set
forth in section 302(c)(5). Any employee-designee administering such
a fund not meeting the requirements of 302(c)(5) is a "representative"
within the meaning of 302(a) and (b) 37
In the second case, the district court 38 employed the old test of activities
(1957). See also Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1959). "Regardless of the

fact that the union did not have sufficient power through representation to negotiate with
the employer under statutory authority, the union was authorized by at least three of the
employees to act in their behalf in matters concerning their employment." Id. at 902.
35 Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958).
36 Mechanical Contractors Ass'n v. Local 420, AFL-CIO, 265 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1959).
37 Id. at 611.
38 South La. Chapter, Natl Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Local 130, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
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performed, rather than the position as trustee. Here a trust fund was established to provide a program for training apprentices in the electrical industry. Four trustees were selected by the employer and four by the union.
The court found that payments to these trustees did not constitute payments
to an employee's representative, because the trust agreement's sole purpose
was the training of apprentices, and it did not invade other areas of labor
management relations, and did not require the joint board of trustees to
perform the functions of a labor organization.
This conflict was finally resolved in 1962 by Cement Masons International
Ass'n v. ParamountPlastering.39 The function of the trust in this case was
to promote the use of plaster. The court held that a trust or a corporation
administering a trust becomes a "representative" of employees within the
meaning of section 302 whenever half of the trustees of the trust or half of
the directors of the corporation are appointed by a labor organization, even
though the purposes of said trust or corporation are limited to promoting
the use of lath and plaster in the construction industry. Although the language in this case appears to be a departure from the circuit court case described above in that it designates the trust and not the trustee as a "representative," it really makes no practical difference whether the jointly administered trust or union trustees are termed "representatives." Unless the trust
is controlled by management, the presence of union appointed trustees
renders the trust a party to whom payments are prohibited. Therefore, the
trustees do not have to participate in the bargaining process to be a "representative." Their position as union appointed trustees renders them "representatives" and makes it necessary for the trust to conform to the specified
requirements in order for the employer to legally make payments to the
trust fund.
Consequently, these most recent cases dealing with the definition of the
term "representative" demonstrate that an individual having authority, to
deal with the employer on behalf of the employees and a trust, jointly
administered by union and management are "representatives" within the
scope of section 302(a). Therefore, such a trust must meet the requirements
of section 302(c)(5). If this were not the case, the exception would be, for
all practical purposes, meaningless; because any trust fund which is established for purposes other than contributing to the process of collective barWorkers, 177 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. La. 1959). Perhaps it could be said that the court reverted
back to the old test of bargaining authority because it was unwilling to invalidate the
trust. But the court could have used the new test, i.e., position as trustee, and found the
trustee to be a representative, thereby achieving the identical result because the NLRA
had been amended to include apprentice programs. Therefore, the validity of this trust
seems never to have been in doubt. Consequently, the court must have been in earnest
when it devoted most of its opinion to a recital of what labor activities would make a
trustee a representative.
39 310 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1962).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

11

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 9
SECTION 302(c)(5)
gaining would not be required to meet the restrictive requirements of
section 302(c)(5).
In the midst of this bulk of litigation 40 over the term "representative,"
Congress itself took action. Just as the courts were struggling to enlarge
the groups to whom payments were prohibited, Congress in 1959 enacted
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act which included specific
amendments to section 302(a). 41 Originally the act prohibited only payments
by an employer to the representatives of his employees. The amendment expanded the term "employer" to include payments made to (I) employer
associations, (2) labor relations experts, advisors or consultants who act
for an employer, and (3) anyone who acts in the interest of the employer.
"Any representative of any of his employees" was expanded to include (1)
representatives of employees, (2) labor organizations representing employees,
(3) employees, causing them to influence other employees in their section 7
rights, and (4) officers of labor organizations, influencing them in their
duties. Thus the aim of Congress and the courts was to enlarge the meaning
of "employer" and "representative" in order to give section 302(a) and (b)
the broadest possible coverage. If section 302(a) and (b) were limited in their
application, the impact of its prohibition would have been negligible, and
the situations which Congress was trying to correct would have remained.
In another situation the requirements of subsection (c)(5) and (6) assume
a particular importance. Under section 302(c)(2) an employer is permitted
to pay to an employee money in accordance with a judgment, decree or
settlement. It might seem that this section is to be read independently of
all other exceptions, and consequently would allow employers to make
these payments by any method they so choose. However, such is not the case.
If payments are to be made to a trust fund, the trust fund must satisfy the
requirements of subsection (c)(5). In Minkoff v. Scranton Frocls, Inc., 2 the
employer made payments to a Health and Welfare Fund and Retirement
Fund pursuant to an award of an arbitrator. The court stated that while
section 302(c)(2) validated these payments, payment to a trust fund is also
an exception, and if it is used, it must comply with the trust requirements.
40 Other cases have found the following individuals to be "representatives" within the
meaning of section 302(a): Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.), ctrt. denied,
353 U.S. 931 (1957) (labor union officials of the International Bhd. of Teamsters); United
States v. Durkin, 161 F. Supp. 287 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (business agents of a local truckers
union); United States v. Lavery, 161 F. Supp. 283 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (business representatives

of the Operating Engineers).
41 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)

(1964).
42 181 F. Supp. 542, 547-49 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd per curiamn, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960). See
also Ulene v. Jacobsen, 209 Cal. App. 2d, 139, 26 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. CL App. 1962). In
Ulene the court held that where an arbitration award directed the employer to pay money

to a trust fund, such trust must comply with the requirements of section 302(c)(5).
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In InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc. 43 an argument was made that the trust fund, established by an agreement between
the employer and the union in settlement of an automation dispute, was a
settlement under section 302(c)(2). The court, discussing this contention,
stated that it need not now attempt to define the area in which section
302(c)(2) affords immunity in that since they used the trust form, it must
conform to the requirements of section 302(c)(5).
COURT INTERPRETATION OF TRUST REQUIREMENTS

As was seen in the previous section, the language of the statute prohibiting employer payments is now interpreted quite broadly. Since all trusts
not dominated by the employer, or, stated another way, having union
trustees, fall within the statutory language of section 302(a)(b), employer
payments to such trusts are forbidden unless the trusts qualify for an
exemption under section 302(c)(5)(6). To qualify for such exemption, the
trust must meet certain requirements. Generally, these requirements are
five in number: (1) the trust fund must be established for the benefit of
the employees of the contributing employer, (2) the trust fund must also
be established for the sole and exclusive benefit of such employees, (3) the
purpose of the trust fund must be for certain, specified types of benefits,
(4) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made must be
specified in a written agreement with the employer, and (5) the employers
and employees must be equally represented in the administration of the
trust fund. These various requirements have caused interminable litigation.
Tremendous disagreement over the scope and meaning of the specific
requirements has resulted in a maze of uncertainty.
Employees of the Contributing Employer
In order to meet the requirement that the trust fund must be established
for the benefit of the "employees" of the "contributing employer," it is
necessary to know the meaning of these terms. Litigation over the exact
definition of these words has developed along two main lines: The earlier
line of cases deals with which of the management's employees are "employees" under the act, and the more recent line of cases deals with whether
other groups of employees are covered.
In the area as to which of management's employees are included in the
term "employers," the court in Upholsterers' Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co.44 held that the statute does not mean that all employees of a
43 326 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1964).

44 82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949). The court reasoned that seldom, if ever, are all the
employees of an employer members of a single union. If § 302(c)(5) required that all
employees be given benefits, trusts would never be set up because, one union is not going
to administer a trust for another union. The court also reasoned that trusts existed before
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single employer must be covered; the trust fund can be set up for just
employees who are union members. In United States v. Pecora4 5 the court
held it was not necessary for the employees to be actually working in order
to be eligible to receive benefits from the trust fund. It was sufficient that
their employment had not been permanently terminated, even though
they were laid off at the time payments were received. In Bolgar v. Lewis4G
only employees of a contributing industry employer were entitled to benefits; but the court in Bey v. Muldoon47 allowed longshoremen of non-contributing industry employers to receive trust fund benefits because of the
interchangeability of longshore employment and the peculiar demands of
the stevedoring industry.
Several 1965 cases have dealt with the problem of retired employees. In
Rittenberry v. Lewis's the court held that a retiree is not an "employee"
within the meaning of section 302(c)(5) if never employed by a contributing employer and that therefore he could not be a beneficiary of trust
funds. The district court decisions in Kroger Co. v. Blassie49 and Jensen v.
Garvison50 found that retirees were not beneficiaries for they were not
actual employees in the sense of being on the payroll. On appeal Blassie
was reversed and the court held that a person for whom employer contri*butions are made prior to retirement is not barred from receiving benefits
of the trust after retirement, and that this qualification is not nullified by
additional contributions made by him or by others on his behalf after
retirement. The court decided that the two requirements of payment by the
employer and current employment do not mean that benefits which flow
from these contributions of the employer are to be confined in their enjoyment to the period of the employee's active employment. Also, the statute
itself refers to pension on retirement, compensation for illness and unemployment benefits; all of which are received when the employee is not
51
working
Four 1965 cases shed some light in the area of whether employees other
than management's employees may receive benefits from the trust fund.
1947 for the benefit of only union members and that if Congress had dcided to change
this practice it would have specifically done so. But see Katz & Jaffe, Illegal Pension and
Welfare Funds, 4 LAB. UJ. 13-18 (1953).
. 45 267 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1959). The defendants, business agents of the union, were
convicted of violating § 302(a). The court held that it was no defense that the union did
not represent the majority of the employer's employees.
46 238 F. Supp. 595 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
47 993 F. Supp. 489 (ED. Pa. 1963).
48 238 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
49 225 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mo. 1964), rev'd, 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965).
50 241 F. Supp. 523 (D. Ore. 1965).
51 See Brief for Appellants, pp. 11-45, Blassie v. Kroger Co., 85 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965),
for further discussion of why retirees should be included in the term "employee."
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United States Trucking Co. v. Strong52 and Jensen, district court cases, did
not allow employees of the union to benefit, even though in each case the
union contributed to the trust as an employer. The Trucking Co. decision
was based on conflict of interest. The court held that the union cannot be
acting solely for the employees it represents when it must consider, as an
employer, its own financial ability to contribute and the effect this may have
on employee dues. 53 In Jensen the court stated that "employer" meant that
group with whom the union bargains and not the union itself in its capacity
as an employer of its own personnel. 54 In Blassie, and in Local 688 v.
Townsend,5 5 circuit court cases, the courts held that a union, if it contributed to the trust fund could be an employer under section 302(c)(5), and
thus the union employees could receive benefits. The courts reasoned that
Congress did not mean to limit "employer" and "employee" to any one
specific meaning. In allowing the union to qualify as an employer, the
court did restrict its role as employer by denying to the union any choice
in the selection of employer representatives or trustees. 50 The Eighth Circuit
also decided that employees of the trust could receive benfits where the
trust contributes to the fund as their employer. However, the restriction
of no voice in the selection of employer trustee applied here as well. It would
seem that the court, in deciding whether trust employees could benefit was
moved in part by the socially desirable result of its decision; because now
a group of a few employees could get the advantageous insurance rates
given to large groups.
Congress is aware of the problems posed by the 1965 cases, Blassie, Townsend, Jenkins, and Trucking Co., and a bill, H.R. 10774, 57 has passed the
House of Representatives 5s which aims to solve the problems created by this
recent litigation. 50 This bill enlarges the groups of persons who may receive
benefits of trust funds by specifically listing who may be a beneficiary. The
bill creates a new subsection, (d), to section 302 which specifies that beneficiaries include employees and officers, and former employees and officers
52

230 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

at 940.
54 241 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. Ore. 1965).
55 345 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1965).
56 Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 73 (8th Cir. 1965). The only employers entitled
to representation in the administration of the fund are those who make contributions
because of their subjectability to collective bargaining. Ibid.
57 H.R. 10774, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
53 Id.

111 CONG. Ryc. 25042 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1965).
59 The House Report from the Committee on Education and Labor to accompany
H.R. 10774, H.R. REP. No. 1039, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), states that since recent litigation has demonstrated that the language of § 302 is ambiguous with regard to who may
receive benefits and whether certain benefits are lawful, these ambiguities need to be
clarified in light of the original intent of the section and with due regard for changing
circumstances.
58
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of an employer association, a labor organization or a trust fund. Thus this
bill would provide definite solutions for the specific situations recently
brought before the courts.
Sole and Exclusive
What is expected in the requirement that the payments be for the "sole
and exclusive" benefit of the employees? Probably that neither the union
nor the employer should receive money or services from the trust fund.
While investing in real estate to house the operation of the trust fund is
not prohibited by the requirement,6 0 it would also seem that the trust should
be an independent operation as to accounts, facilities, employees and files.
However, does having the trust offices in the same building that houses
the union offices violate this requirement? In considering this problem, the
court stated in American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick:61
Upon careful consideration of the facts, the affidavits, the briefs, and
the necessity of maintaining the complete integrity of the Fund and
its management free of influence of labor or management . . . the
trustees of the Fund shall be required to seek other convenient, suitable and adequate quarters away from the premises of the Union building.62
Blassie v. Kroger Co. also dealt with the problem of location of trust offices,
and held that having them in the building owned by the union which
rendered a benefit to a landlord who was also an interested party was an
abuse of the discretion of the trustees. 63 The court in Blassie found that the
sole and exclusive requirement had been further violated in that the trustees
had entered into an agreement with a pharmacy to sell drugs at lower
prices not only to employees, who were beneficiaries of the trust, but to
other customers as well. 64 Thus, the trust was being used to benefit persons
who were not connected with the trust, and who did not qualify as an employee and beneficiary.
Written Agreement
The third requirement is that the detailed basis upon which such payments are to be made must be specified in a written agreement with the
60 In re Briddayers Local 1 Welfare Fund, 159 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Where
operation of union welfare fund required adequate space which must be rented or owned.
and exhibits indicated the inadequacy of existing quarters, expenditures of welfare funds

for purpose of investing in real estate to house the operation of the fund was not prohibited
by the requirement that the trust fund be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
.employee. Id. at 43.
61 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aff'd, 285 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1960).

62 Id. at 885.
63 45 F.2d 58, 76 (8th Cir. 1965).
64

Id. at 75.
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employer. This requirement has also been before the courts. Originally it
was interpreted to mean that the arrangement by which an employer would
make payments to the fund must be in writing.05 However, a more recent
case has held that the requirement of a written agreement relates to the
detailed basis on which benefit payments are to be made from the fund to
the employees.6 6 This later interpretation appears to be the more logical
in the light of congressional concern over where the money goes, and its
source.
Types of Benefits
The most far reaching requirement is that trust money may be expended
only for those benefits which are specifically listed in section 302(c)(5) and
(6):
[S]uch payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from
principal or income or both ....
for medical or hospital care, pensions
on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or
illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide
any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance or accident insurance; . . . pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training programs .... 67
All other purposes of the trust fund are condemned, as will be demonstrated
by examining several cases.
In Ulene v. Jacobsen,68 the trust agreement allowed the trustees of the
fund, in their discretion, to contribute to charitable medical institutions or
organizations and to other institutions or organizations which contribute
to or serve the welfare of beneficiaries of the trust fund. Since contributions
to charities is not one of the permissible purposes for a trust fund, that
portion of the trust agreement giving the trustees power to make charitable
contributions was held invalid.69 In Blassie v. Kroger Co., a portion of the
65 Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterers' Soc'y, 186 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. 111.
1960), on remand from, 279 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960).
66 Bey v. Muldoon, 217 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Auten v. Local 11 Elec. Workers
IBEW (D.C.S. Cal. 1965) 58:2531.
67 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1964). One unresolved question with respect to benefits concerns
the permissibility of "self-insurance" of benefits by direct payment from the fund, rather

than through an insurance policy with an outside insurance carrier. The statutory language indicates that some benefits can be both from trust funds or by insurance, others
from the trust. Did Congress intend to create a difference? Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts
Under Section 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 59 Nw. U.L. lv. 719, 743 (1965).
68 209 Cal. App. 2d 139, 26 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
69 Two other situations in which the court ruled on the legality of the purposes of a
trust fund need 'to be mentioned. In United Garment Workers V. Jacob Reed's Sons, 83
F. Supp 49 (E.D. Pa. 1949), the court decided that a trust was valid which authorized the
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trust fund money was spent for the purchase and development of land for
recreation purposes50 In striking down this part of the trust as violative
of 302(c)(5), the court stated that it was faced with a carefully drawn and
restrictive statute, and believed it right and proper to leave expansion of the
act to include other purposes, such as recreation, to Congress. The
bill,71 mentioned earlier, includes an amendment to section 302(c)(6) which
would enlarge the permissible benefits to include recreation and health
camps and facilities. Thus, there is at present an attempt by Congress to
allow trust funds to be spent for recreation.
Union and management have attempted to set up jointly administered
trust funds for the purpose of dealing with labor disputes. In Sheet Metal
2
a Joint Industry
Contractor'sAss'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Inter. Assn71
Board was established under a trust agreement to which employers paid two
and a half cents per hour worked by the employees for the purposes of,
inter alia, (1) aiding in settling disputes between labor and management, and
(2) setting up a joint arbitration committee.73 The trust in Mechanical
trustees to invest money by making loans to beneficiaries. The court based its decision on
the fact that the trustee has the power to invest because the statute states that payments
are to be made "either from principle or income," and also that this was not a payment
from the trust fund but an investment loan. In Kane v. Shulton, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 882
(D.N.J. 1960), the court was faced with the question of the legality of a proposed transfer
of funds from a health and welfare fund to a newly established pension plan, because
a transfer is not one of the stated purposes. This problem was not resolved because the
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
70 Although the court refers to this trust as one primarily for recreation, the Brief
for Appellants by Amicus Curiae, pp. 5-35 describes it in somewhat different terms.
The Brief submits arguments to the effect that the recreational facility established and
maintained by trust funds is primarily a health and medical camp, not recreational, and
thus is permitted by § 302(c)(5). The camp was under the supervision and direction of
a medical director who was assisted and counselled by a staff of approximately forty
licensed physicians, surgeons and psychiatrists. Day and overnight camps were conducted
for children in addition to providing an integrated program of adult physical fitness.
Facilities for occupational therapy and group therapy for such medical problems as
diabetes and heart disease were under construction. Already in operation were a swimming
pool and facilities for various athletic contests. These facilities, which can be termed
recreational, obviously produce definite health and medical benefits as well. The unquestionable intent of the statutory language was described by Senator Overton, 92 Co.Nc. Rzc.
5180 (1946):
There is nothing, -therefore, in the amendment that inhibits the establishment of
health and hygenic programs, welfare programs, recreational programs, or other
programs ....
71 -LP. 10774, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
72 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957).
73 Specifically, the trust purposes were to: (1) administer the fund, (2) aid in the settlement of disputes between the union and the employers association, (5) set up a joint
arbitration committee, (4) supervise and administer an apprenticeship program, (5) provide
a forum for discussion of the problems of the industry, and (6) cooperate with public and
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Contractors Ass'n v. Local 42074 was established for very similar purposes,
one of which was to supervise and administer an apprentice training pro-

gram. The courts held that the joint boards were "representatives," and
therefore that payments to them were illegal, unless the trusts met the

standards of section 302(c)(5). Since the trusts were established for unlisted
benefits such as dealing with labor disputes and setting up apprentice train-

ing programs, they did not meet the standards of a section 302(c)(5) trust
fund and consequently they were declared invalid. 7r The 1959 amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act contained amendments to section

302(c) 7 6 in which an entirely new subsection, (c)(6), was added to section
302(c). This subsection allows payments to a trust fund established for the
purpose of (a) pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits; or
(b) defraying the costs of apprenticeship or other training programs. Therefore the situation which existed in Mechanical Contractors and Sheet Metal

as to apprenticeship training programs has been corrected by Congress."
One writer stated that with these additions, section 302(c)(5) and (6) seem
to include almost every type of employee benefit currently the subject of
collective bargaining, including benefits under the recently developed
automation or technological change trusts. 78 In view of the fact that the

courts have consistently given a strict interpretation to the statutory language, it is doubtful whether all trusts dealing with the problems of automation would fall within the exception, "or other training programs."
Another bill, H.R. 1153, 7 9 which has passed the House of Representatives,8 0
quasi-public bodies with regard to legislation and other matters of interest to the

industry. Id. at 312.
74 265 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1959).
75 Before the 1959 amendments to the NLRA there was a conflict of policy here.
Although condemned under § 302, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to promote the
welfare of apprentices and encourage labor standards by bringing together labor and
management for the formulation of apprenticeship programs. 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1964).
76 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6)
(1964). Also, the 1959 act expanded the § 302(c)(2) exception for regular compensation
paid to a union officer who is also an employee of the employer to include payments to
employees whose established duties include acting openly for the employer In labor
relations or personnel matters. This made it clear that the bars on employer payments
to employees do not apply to payments made to the personnel staff.
77 104 CONG. RiE. 7468 (1958). The amendment would apply to all such apprenticeship
and training trust funds, but it is of particular importance to the building and construction industry in which such trust funds are numerous. Because of the unique employment relationships and hiring practices in the construction industry, training Is
considered as a joint responsibility of the employer and employee, and in most instances
is financed by contributions to a joint trust fund which finances the payment of salaries,
instruction and other costs of administration.
78 Goetz, supra note 67, at 744.
79 H.R. 1153, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
80 111 CONG. Riec. 19143 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1965).
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deals with the other problem posed by Mechanical Contractors and Sheet
Met, i.e., that of establishing a trust fund to deal with labor disputes. The
bil'adds subsection (7) to section 802(c) allowing payments by an employer
o a trust fund established for the purpose of creating a joint committee or
board empowered to interpret provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. However, a proviso limits the use of collective bargaining funds
to interpreting provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and to
resolving and determining issues arising from disputes regarding the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which are binding on the
parties. Here again it may be seen that Congress is taking note of court
decisions which have invalidated trusts established for illegal purposes and
is moving in response to these decisions.
Three cases have considered the problem of product promotional funds.
In the case of Application of Warcholsl the trust fund was a promotional
and educational fund to stimulate new business and to increase employment
in the industry. The trust was invalidated by the court because it did not
fall within the section 302(c)(5) trust fund exception in that product promotion is not one of the listed purposes. In ConditionedAir and Refrigeration Co. v. Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Trust,82 one of the provisions of the
trust was to protect the general public from imperfect, improper and unsanitary installations, poor or shoddy materials and poor or improper work
and workmanship. In enjoining the trust from receiving any money from
the employer, Judge Jerthey stated:
I am aware that labor-management plans are to be encouraged. I
recognize that great strides have been made in such fields to the
benefit of labor, management and the public. As a Judge, however, as
stated by counsel for the defendant, my duty is to determine whether
the cloth is cut to fit the pattern laid down by the Legislature. It is not
for the Court to push or pull the pattern to fit the cloth already cut or
to trim the cloth already cut to fit the pattern. 3
In Weir v. Chicago Plastering Institute, Inc.8 4 an institute was created,
jointly administered by employer and union, to run three trusts, one of
which was a General Fund for the purpose of the advancement of plaster
construction over inferior substitutes, by (1) education of the public, (2) by
sponsoring legislation calculated to preserve the health and safety of the
public by the use of plaster construction, (3) discourage attempts to pass
legislation derogatory to plaster construction, and (4) to do those things
81 195 N.Y. Supp. 2d 317 (Sup. CL 1959).
82 159 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
83 Id. at 900.
84 177 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. II 1959), rc'd and remanded sub nor, Emplo-ing Plasterers'
Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterer's Soc'y, 279 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960), on remand, 186 F. Supp.

91 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
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which are necessary and proper to promote and enhance the plastering
industry. Although the district court found that it did not have jurisdiction
it rendered an opinion as to the validity of this trust fund. The court decided that the trust did not comply with section 302(c)(5) because the Inti.
tute was also administering a welfare fund, and it had discretion to dh.
tribute the money between two funds. If the trust administers a welfare
fund, it is a "representative" and to be valid must come within the (c)(5)
exception and here the trust does not come within the exception because
promoting plaster was one of its purposes. On remand the court found that
it had jurisdiction. Judge Campbell now found that the Institute was a
valid trust for the discretionary power had been removed and the funds were
entirely separate, thus payments to it were not to a "representative" since
only a welfare fund is a "representative." While cases previously discussed
indicate that the term "representative" is broader than trust funds which
are exclusively welfare funds, the court in Weir approved the trust and
stated that "to adopt the theory of plaintiff [to the effect any trust is under
section 302 if a union representative is on its board] would in effect destroy
many present and future joint management-union cooperative efforts ....
It would be difficult to conceive of any joint board even for social events,
such as dances, picnics or the like,"85 which would not violate section 302
if union trustees are board members. But unfortunately, as the statute is
interpreted, such joint boards would violate section 302, for social events
are not permissible purposes of a trust fund.
The bill currently under consideration, H.R. 1153, also deals with the
problem of promotion funds s6 and the new subsection (7) allows payments
by an employer to a trust fund established for the purpose of creating a joint
industry promotion program. However, a proviso limits the use of promotion program funds to (1)product and product application, research development and market development, (2) promotion of product and product
application with architects, engineers and government contracting officials,
(3) product and product application to public relations, and (4) publication
of product and product application technical information and data. Therefore, Congress again was forced to consider new amendments in order to
prevent trust funds from being invalidated by the courts.
The trust fund has also been used to solve labor disputes. International
Longshoremen's Ass/n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.sT reveals the following facts.
During the course of collective bargaining negotiations, the ILA objected
to the employer's use of pre-loaded cargo containers, a form of automation,
in the port of New York. The use of containers reduced the employment of
ILA members, and thereby adversely affected that portion of the ILA's
85 Id. at 95.
88 H.R 1153, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
ST 326 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1964).
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income that is derived from a dues check-off based on the hours worked
by each employee. This dispute was settled by the employer's agreeing to
pay twenty-eight cents per ton on "containerized" freight handled into a
fund to be jointly administered by labor and management. The ILA also
demanded that part of the fund be paid to it as compensation for its loss
of revenue. This demand was rejected by the employers on the ground that
such payment would violate section 802. The court agreed with the employer, and held the trust invalid since the permissible purposes of trust
funds do not include compensating a union for lost union dues. Thus the
solution to the labor dispute was brought to an abrupt end. A labor dispute
was also involved in Shapiro v. Rosenbaum.88 For years the American Federation of Musicians felt that the commercial use of recordings was resulting
in wide-scale unemployment of musicians. Consequently, members of AFM
ceased to play for recording purposes. This work stoppage was ended by
an agreement entered into between AFM and Recording Companies which
stipulated that the companies would pay one percent of the retail price of
records to an AFM fund for the purpose of paying musicians for live performances given free to the public. The recording companies were then
advised that such payments were illegal under section 302 since they were
for purposes not recognized by the statute. Therefore, they entered into a
new agreement to take the arrangement out from under prohibited payments by selecting a trustee, Rosenbaum, to administer the trust. He was
not affiliated with AFM or any union and thus was not a "representative."
If the new agreement had not taken the arrangement out from under the
prohibited payments of section 302(a), the trust fund would have been
invalidated because of the impossibility of meeting the trust requirements,8
and the labor dispute between the AFM and the recording companies would
have been reopened.
Effect of Trust Requirements
From the foregoing it can be seen that the trust requirements are both
subject to various interpretations and unduly restrictive, thus preventing
labor and management from cooperatively working out their mutual problems. The litigation over who is an "employee" and "employer," what is
"sole and exclusive," and the requirement of a written agreement brought
an end to various provisions of trust agreements because the statutory
meaning of these phrases was in serious doubt. Since the statute provides a
framework for jointly administered trust funds, through which labor and
88 171 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
89 Another requirement of trusts funds, that benefits be for employees of the contributing employer, was perhaps violated; because the members of the AFM 'were not em-

ployed by recording companies. Also, the funds were paid to any musician, not just to
musicians associated with the AFM.
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management can work together, it should not be worded so vaguely as to
thwart the very end it seeks to achieve.
The types of benefits permitted by the statute have proved to be an incomplete list. Cases have been discussed where labor and management have
attempted to establish a trust fund for such purposes as recreation, donations to charity, product promotion, facilities for settling disputes, union
dues and technological advancement. In each of these instances the trusts
were declared invalid as not meeting the requirement that the trust fund
be established for specified benefits. Other benefits created by a trust, such
as providing a forum for discussion of the problems of the industry and
cooperating with the public and quasi-public bodies with regard to legislation and other matters of interest to the industry, have also been rejected
by the courts.9 0 Judicial interpretations of the statute concerning the permissible types of benefits have uniformly construed the statute to mean that
Congress only intended to allow those trusts it specifically listed, and that it
had condemned all others. 91 Therefore, though the 1959 amendment adds
apprenticeship training programs to the list of benefits and the two bills
now before the Congress will add product promotion, recreation and facilities for settling disputes to the list of permissible purposes, it is a reasonable
conclusion that trusts established for purposes such as industry wide advertising, lobbying, low-cost housing, scholarships, employee readjustment
incident to plant relocation, employee credit unions and impartial collection of economic data as background for collective bargainings would still
be invalid. It is submitted that the aforementioned are all areas for profitable use of jointly administered trust funds, and that simply because of the
drafting technique of Congress they are condemned. Applying the fourfold
purposes of Congress in enacting the statute, to prevent bribes, to prevent
extortion, to protect the funds for the beneficiaries, and to keep the funds
out of union control, it is difficult to see why any of these funds are not allowed, because they do not give rebirth to those practices which Congress
sought to end. Even the trust established in the Seatrain case where part
of the funds were to be paid to the union to replace lost dues is in accord
with the basic purposes of the statute. Congress created the trust requirement to protect money designated for employee benefits so that it would
reach the employees and not be usurped by the union. It was not the
90 Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958); see 46 CALIF. L. Rlv. 480, 482 (1948) where it is stated
that the Lithographer's Union has proposed a fund for research in the automation of
lithography. Since the permissible purposes of a trust fund do not include lithography,
it is doubtful that such a trust is valid.
91 Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959). The Court stated that: "To remove these
dangers, specific standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be established only for purposes which Congress considered proper and expended only for purposes for which they were intended." Id. at 426.
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purpose of Congress to deprive a union of its dues or payments in lieu of
dues. Concededly, this is a payment straight to the "war chest" of the union,
but it is not the type of payment that Senator Taft condemned in his
remarks in support of section 302.92 He was referring to the situation where
trust funds were established for welfare benefits for employees and these
funds were being siphoned off into union coffers. Here we are concerned
not with payments to a trust fund which rightfully belongs to the employees,
but with payments which have been designated as belonging to the union.
Also, the union is entitled to its portion of the trust fund because the trust
money represents lost salary to the employee, and union dues were assessed
according to the employee's salary. Therefore, if the employee had received
his salary, he would have paid his proportional amount of dues. And since
the agreement might never have been arrived at without the efforts of the
union, it seems only proper that they too should benefit from the trust.
These forbidden areas into which a trust fund may not tred involve
problems common to labor and management, and are peculiarly adaptable
to cooperative efforts. Settling disputes, adjusting grievances, arbitration,
promoting the employer's product are matters which are inherently in the
interests of both union and management. Other matters such as low cost
housing, credit unions, industrial problems and legislation affecting industry might perhaps be primarily concerned with the employer or employee
but, nevertheless, in each case, both groups should be involved in the
administration of such a fund. But where both the employer and the employee actually benefit from the trust fund, the fund could be challenged
by the requirement that it must be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees. Therefore, it appears that this requirement is also unduly
restrictive.
The courts, when faced with the problem of deciding the validity of a
section 302(c)(5) trust fund, seem almost apologetic when they strike the
death blow. In passing judgment on a jointly administered trust to promote
the use of plaster one court stated:
This court can believe that Congress might well have, or even should
have, provided additional exemptions, permitting the setting up of
laudable trusts that are vital to the preservation of the economic position of both labor and management, yet this court cannot be the
arbiter of what exceptions should be. That is the duty and responsibility of Congress.9 3 . . .We do not quarrel in the slightest with the
laudable objections of the trust amicably created by labor and management in this case. We sympathize with the efforts of both labor and management to solve a vexing industry problem ....
92
93

We cannot widen the

93

CONG. RE. 474647 (1947).
Local 2, Operative Plasterers' Ass'n v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 310 F.2d 179, 186

(9th Cir.), cert. 4rnied, 72 U-S, 944 (1962),
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door when the door still has been carefully tailored by the representatives in CongressY4
Joint labor-management boards are steadily increasing as a means of creating mutual confidence and developing joint responsibility for the affairs
of industry. Labor and management should be able to create a jointly
administered fund for any purpose which does not perpetuate any of the
practices which Congress condemned when it enacted the original section
802. Testimony before congressional subcommittees has dealt with the issue
of whether jointly administered funds should be allowed in areas where
benefit to industry is predominant, such as product promotional funds.
Mr. Haggerty, President of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, in his testimony,9 5 pointed out that the quality and
usefulness of the manufacturer's products affects both employer and employee and mutual effort is necessary towards the development of such
products. Opposition is based on such factors as: (a) unions having no legitimate interest in this area, (b) the union's interest being at most indirect
and peripheral, and (c) management having the right to manage.0 0 It would
seem that the better view is to make it possible for the employer and the
union to cooperate in this area, if they so desire. According to Mr. Haggerty
the desire is present and because many such promotional funds exist illegally.97 Also, not only do these trust funds promote cooperation, but they
have been the very instrument by which labor disputes were solved. Knowing the disastrous effects that some methods of solving disputes, such as
strikes, boycotts, and plant shutdowns have on our economy, it is mandatory
that Congress mend its ways in order to give labor and management the
opportunity to utilize this effective means of resolving differences.
CONCLUSION

Amendments to section 302 are necessary because Congress, by enacting
a general prohibition and then setting forth certain specific exceptions,
impliedly prohibited everything not specifically excepted, regardless of its
merits. Recent litigation has pointed out the ambiguities in section 802
with regard to questions such as who may receive benefits, and whether
certain benefits are lawful. Congress, through amendments, has attempted to
clarify the ambiguous language and has enlarged the permitted benefits
in light of the original intent of the section and with due regard to changing
circumstances. It has adopted the method of making slight changes in the
wording of the statute in order to officially recognize and correct the inade94 Id. at 191.

95 Hearings on H.R. 1155 before House Subcommittee of the Committee on Education
and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
96 Id. at 17-21.
97 Id. at 10.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

25

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 9
SECTION 302(c)(5)
quacies of the statute which have been aired in the courts. But literal judicial decisions and the emergence of new programs suitable for a jointly
administered trust, that cannot be foreseen at present, except perhaps
hypothetically, will undoubtedly require still further legislation. Therefore,
Congress is making a half-hearted attempt, somewhat belatedly, to bring
the statute up to date and is not taking into consideration what the future
developments might be. It would seem that Congress ought to examine the
basic framework of the statute in order to determine whether it is the appropriate vehicle for the promulgation of guidelines for the establishment of

jointly administered trust funds. The statute, as it presently reads, requires
courts to invalidate many worthy trusts, and declares that other such trusts,
uncontested as yet, are existing illegally. Congress should recognize the
great need for cooperation between these two powerful groups, labor and
management, and aid them in mutually solving their problems-not enact
legislation which denies them the opportunity to jointly administer trust
programs. Thus, the question arises of how Congress can permit employer
payments to jointly administered trust funds for meritorious purposes
without unduly restricting the purposes for which the trust is established.
Obviously, piecemeal legislation which amends the existing statute is not
the answer, because such legislation does not cure the ills of the statute,
but merely gives support therapy.
One solution to the problem of continuous litigation is to avoid the
prohibition of section 302(a), thus making it unnecessary to bring the trust
under the trust fund exception. To state it in the reverse, if the trust cannot
meet the requirements of section 302(c)(5), then the employer could make
payments to one who is not prohibited from receiving them. Since section
302(a) has been expanded to reach a variety of groups, care must be taken
in the selection of a trustee. He must be completely independent of union
affiliation and connection. This is aptly demonstrated in Shapiro v. Rosenbaum.98 In that case, in order to make the payments legal, the fund was
administered by Rosenbaum who was selected by the record companies and
was not affiliated with AFM or any union. The trust agreement spedfically
provided that no trustee could be a representative of labor, of any union or
of any employee within the meaning of section 302. Rosenbaum was designated by the phonograph companies and was a practicing attorney who had
at one time represented employers. Under the trust agreement any successor
trustee was to be designated by the Secretary of Labor. The court found
that he was neither dominated nor controlled by the union, notwithstanding
the fact that he did have certain contacts with the union. These contacts
included consultation with, and receipt of recommendations from locals of
the union concerning performances to be made, certifications from the local
union that the performances actually had been rendered, and the furnishing
98 171 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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to the International and locals copies of semi-annual reports. The court in
Frackmann v. Bardot99 pointed out that if the trustee is appointed and controlled by the union, he is a "representative." In Frackmann the trustee
was an attorney who, the court stated, if subject to removal and replacement
by the union, would be under sufficient union control to render the arrangement violative of section 302. It would seem that this power would in itself
be sufficient to establish effective control of the trustee. Thus, the applicability of section 302 depends on the trustee's degree of independence from
union control. There was not enough independence in Mechanical Contractors,00 where such control existed merely by virtue of a veto power. In
Bey v. Muldoon,101 the escrow was, in effect, administered by the union,
since there could be no withdrawals without a trust agreement; and the
union had the power to block the completion of trust agreement.
Although this arrangement, where the trustees are not "representatives,"
would bring an end to court interpretations of the meaning of the requirements of 302(c)(5) because this provision would not need to be met, the
basic problem of union-management cooperation is thrown to the winds.
For, in such a situation, management turns its back on the union and sets
up its own fund, to be administered by management or its own representatives with no voice or control by the union. Since the object of such funds
concerns the interest of both groups, it would be preferable to allow both
management and labor to administer the fund.
Another solution would be to amend the statute and strike down all the
requirements which a trust fund must meet. But this would allow the employer to make payments to prohibited persons, providing he made them to
a trust fund. Consequently, this arrangement is not the answer, because it
would allow bribes, direct contributions to unions and extortion covered up
by the trust form. This is exactly the abuse Congress was trying to avoid.
Therefore, some control over the trust fund money is necessary.
Since some control is necessary, perhaps the wisest road to follow would
be to lessen the restrictiveness of the provisions and use broad general
statutory language. At first blush this appears to be an excellent solution.
Much legislation is so composed in order to perpetuate its usefulness and
meaning in the future. This would allow union and management to cooperatively set up funds within the framework of permissible bounds. But,
as is always the case, the boundaries cannot be definitely defined; thus litigation would ultimately follow whenever management or labor disagreed
over the extent of the applicable boundaries. True, restrictiveness would no
longer be a problem; but vagueness would take its place. Since the validity
of all existent present trust funds becomes uncertain whenever the courts
99 191 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
100 265 F2d 607 (3d Cir. 1959). See text accompanying note 74 supra.
101 223 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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entertain suits and render conflicting opinions as to the scope of section 302
and, also, since constant litigation always causes an air of uneasiness to
prevail, it would be best if this continuous court action could be curtailed
as much as possible.
It is submitted that the best solution, and one that would avoid the
difficulties of section 302 as it now stands as well as the various alternatives
that have been discussed, would be to establish an administrative agency
whose prior approval would be a prerequisite to the creation of a trust. In
addition, the agency would be vested with general regulatory power over the
administration of the trust after its inception as well as the authority to
revoke its approval upon the showing of proper cause. In light of the recent
hearings before the McClellan Committee involving trusts dominated by
George Barasch, 02 the trusts are still plagued with abuse by those who
administer the trust funds. Consequently, it would seem that there is a need
for an agency with power to oversee the administration of the trusts in order
to diminish the presence of illegal practices in regard to those who control
these trust funds.
In order to give effect to this solution, very little change in the statute
seems to be called for. Probably the only thing necessary would be the
amendment of subsections (c)(5) and (6) so that such subsections would read:
[The provisions of this section shall not be applicable]; (5) with respect
to money or other thing of value which is paid to a trust fund, jointly
administered by labor and management, if the trust has been approved
by the Labor-Management Trust Authority.
Additional language may be necessary in order to properly provide for
trusts which were created under the current provisions of section 302.
It is essential that the language should require that such trusts should be
placed under the control and supervision of the Authority immediately,
but time should be granted-at least as much as one year-before they
should be required to obtain approval.
The act creating the Labor-Management Trust Authority will require
careful drafting, and it might be wise to devote section I to matters which
would usually appear in a preamble. Recommended for inclusion in this
section is the following sentence:
The creation of trusts as a phase of the employment relation is affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to regulate and

control such trusts and the practices and matters related thereto.
In the body of the enabling act, similar language will be necessary in
order to provide standards for both rule making and for the issuance and
102 Diversion of Union Welfare-Pension Funds of Allied Trades Council and Teamsters
Local 815, Hearings before Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 89th Cong., 1st
sess. 19%5).
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revocation of certificates of approval. For example, it might be provided
that a proposal for a trust shall not be approved unless the Authority shall
find that such proposal promotes, as a phase of national welfare, the development of harmonious employment relations. This standard would be
used to judge each separate portion of the trust submitted for approval:
(1) who may contribute, (2) the minimum amount of contribution, (3) the
selection of trustees for which the employer and the union must be equally
represented, (4) the beneficiaries, and (5) the type of benefit for which trust
money will be expended. Revocation should be based primarily on mismanagement or dishonesty. The act should also contain provisions for the
dissolution of a trust if its purpose or aim ceases to exist, and the Authority
should provide by rule for disposition of assets upon either the dissolution
of the trust or the revocation of a certificate.
The work of the Labor-Management Trust Authority should be confined
to the approval and regulation of trust funds so as to avoid duplication of
effort and overlap of authority with other government agencies, For example, the Authority should not eliminate the activities of the Internal
Revenue Service1 08 in passing upon questions of qualification for taxexemption in connection with jointly-administered trusts. Also, the Department of Justice should still have prosecuting authority for violations of
section 802. The Authority would supplant the Department of Justice only
to the extent that jointly-administered trusts which have a certificate of
approval from the Authority would be immune from prosecution. All
individuals and groups, including unapproved trusts, who receive payments
from an employer would be subject to prosecution if there is a violation
of section 302.
In addition to the general program, the mechanics of an administrative
agency should be specifically provided for in the Act. The Authority should
consist of at least three members who will obtain office by means of the
customary presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Careful attention should be given to the qualifications of the members, with one each coming respectively from the ranks of labor and management, and the third member should be an independent who has had experience in finance and investments. Terms of office should be staggered.
The Authority should be authorized to promulgate rules and regulations, to
hold hearings, to make investigations, and should be required to follow the
procedure of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. In addition, power
should be granted to issue subpoenas, to sub-delegate authority and to
require uniform methods of record keeping by an approved trust. Finally,
a provision should be included which would instruct the Authority to prepare and issue a list of approved investments for trust funds, and to authorize the amendment of the list from time to time.
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-I (1966).
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The presence of such an Authority should terminate much of the litigation over such trusts, and would allow the purposes of trust funds to expand
with changing circumstances in order to keep them efficient instruments for
the promotion of the public interest.
A. F.
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